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DEEDS AND THE DETERMINACY NORM:  
INSIGHTS FROM BRANDT AND OTHER CASES ON  
AN UNDESIGNATED, YET EVER-PRESENT,  
INTERPRETIVE METHOD 
DONALD J. KOCHAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights contained in the deed. 
The rights contained in the deed are only as good as the ability to get those rights enforced.  
And, the enforcement is only valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from 
the point of conveyance. This Article pens the term “determinacy norm” to explain a collection 
of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that aim to make the meaning of deed terms de-
terminate. I contend that, in order to satisfy the determinacy norm for deed interpretation, 
courts must (and arguably do) interpret the terms in deeds and land grants as having a fixed 
meaning set contemporaneously with the transfer and based on the discernable intent and 
expectations of the parties at the time of the conveyance or grant. This norm runs through 
existing case law and is pivotal to facilitating an effective property system. But, courts have 
failed to recognize either the term (or even the organizing principle) that is the determinacy 
norm.  
 As an illustrative example, some see the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court case of Brandt Revo-
cable Trust v. United States as just a railroad right-of-way decision. But a closer look reveals 
that it is a good exemplar of courts striving to add determinacy to deeds and equivalent in-
struments like statutory land grants. Brandt reveals a pattern of U.S. Supreme Court juris-
prudence that the Court itself is not adequately articulating where the determinacy norm 
lurks in the substructure of opinions. 
 We should more directly recognize the determinacy norm’s presence in private deed and 
public land grant cases. Doing so will allow us to better monitor and check the actions of 
judges to be sure that they are living up to the constraints of the determinacy norm.  Such 
monitoring will help us better identify and protect the rights in the deeds that help organize 
our property system. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights 
contained in the deed. The rights contained in the deed are only as good 
as the ability to get those rights enforced. And, the enforcement is only 
                                                                                                                  
 * Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Chap-
man University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School 1998. I wish to thank 
Shelley Ross Saxer and Jennifer Spinella for valuable comments on drafts of this work. 
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valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from the 
point of conveyance. This Article examines those basic tenets of our 
system of property law. It posits that the law of property depends on 
enforcement of the private agreements expressed in deeds and that the 
rules of interpretation for deeds have evolved around what I will call 
a “determinacy norm,” without which deeds would have only limited 
value, if any at all. In this Article, I define the parameters of the “de-
terminacy norm” as follows: In order to satisfy the determinacy norm 
for deed interpretation, courts must interpret the terms in deeds and 
land grants as having a fixed meaning set contemporaneously with the 
transfer and based on the discernable intent and expectations of the 
parties at the time of the conveyance or grant. It is this premise that I 
seek to show runs through existing case law and that I intend to defend 
as meritorious in our interpretation of deeds and pivotal to facilitating 
an effective and efficient property system. 
 In the 1979 case of Leo Sheep v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court articulated an extremely important tenet of judicial interpreta-
tion of real property deeds and statutory grants of title when it de-
clared that the “Court has traditionally recognized the special need for 
certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned” and that 
the Court is extremely conscious of a presumptive “unwilling[ness] to 
upset settled expectations” of the parties to the title transfer.1 There is 
much to be learned from that statement and the critically important 
fundamentals of the determinacy norm that rest behind it. 
 In several recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, including most re-
cently the March 10, 2014, case of Brandt Revocable Trust v. United 
States,2 this tenet has played an undervalued yet critical role in the 
determination of the meaning of terms in property deeds (or in the 
near-equivalence of deeds, where property is transferred by statutory 
grants of land, by government patents, or with statutory reservations 
of real property interests). And, this special need for certainty and pre-
dictability has been a theme that plays a vital part in the general 
preservation of an efficient and effective system of established prop-
erty rights and secure property conveyances.3 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (emphasis added).  
 2. 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014). 
 3. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 140 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990) (“One gets efficient institutions 
by a polity that has built-in incentives to create and enforce efficient property rights.”); Jo-
seph William Singer, Property Law Conflicts, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 129, 130 (2014) (“Predicta-
bility and usability of property depend on clear answers to ownership questions.”). 
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 It is a fundamental principle of the interpretation of property deeds 
that they must have a fixed meaning, identifiable at the time of con-
veyance.4 This concept lacks comprehensive coverage in the literature 
and has not been sufficiently captured in a particular term.  This Arti-
cle seeks to fill these gaps and proposes that this concept should be 
termed the “determinacy norm” for deed interpretation. This norm fo-
cuses on the need to find a definite, exact, and unchanging meaning in 
the terms of the deed, set and fixed at the transfer point such that 
going forward all parties can rely on a single interpretation in making 
investment decisions related to the property and all parties to the deed 
transfer can appropriately set their expectations regarding what was 
given and what was retained—the “who has what and when” issues. It 
is the application of what might be called a “rule of deeds” that reflects 
the same rule of law values that we impose on the legal system  
generally.5 
 Property ownership and the scope of one’s deed must be settled, 
knowable, and known from the outset of property acquisition. If they 
are not, the indeterminacy of the deeds in our system would have pro-
foundly damaging impacts on the investment and incentive structure 
present in the private property system. Any other interpretation would 
create shifting private property rights whose security would simply be 
at the whim of others, including governments, judges, neighbors, or 
competing claimants. 
 This Article will not empirically test whether deed interpretation 
is, in fact and in practice, accomplished with a high level of determi-
nacy. That is beyond the scope of this Article, which aims to show in 
this installment only that the goal of deed interpretation as expressed 
in the rules of interpretation is to find determinate meaning in deeds. 
Nonetheless, this Article will show examples where in practice the de-
terminacy norm for deed interpretation seems vibrant.  
 Thus, this Article analyzes this determinacy norm both in the ab-
stract and, importantly, in the context of several actual cases, includ-
ing Brandt.6 The Brandt case (like many of the other cases highlighted 
here) has received a relatively small amount of attention in scholarly 
analysis, and almost none of that attention has focused on the rules of 
deed and land grant interpretation,7 even though, as Danaya Wright 
                                                                                                                  
 4. See 2 ROBERT T. DEVLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEEDS § 836, at 102, § 851, at 
128 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co., 2d ed. 1887); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, Westlaw 
(database updated Dec. 2015).  
 5. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist So-
ciety, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1012 (1995) (“[M]ost theorists have assumed that the rule 
of law requires a significant measure of determinacy in legal rules.”). 
 6. 134 S. Ct. at 1257. 
 7. Only a few case summaries, articles, or student notes in law journals have been 
published since the decision, almost all critical of the outcome and not particularly focused 
on deed interpretation issues. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Doing a Double Take: Rail-Trail 
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has written, the Supreme Court in Brandt “hand[ed] the government 
a stunning 8-1 defeat on an issue of statutory construction of an 1875 
act that granted rights-of-way over public lands to railroads.”8 Part of 
the purpose of this Article will be to show that the decision should not 
be considered stunning at all if one acknowledges the longstanding 
precedents on conveyance interpretation involved in the decision and 
their fit inside a pattern of deed-based jurisprudence that recognizes a 
determinacy norm. 
 Brandt can be briefly summarized as follows. The government 
claimed reversionary interests in railroad easements after railroad op-
erations ceased.9 The property owners claimed that easement law 
counsels differently—that the government only obtained a limited in-
terest in the property, that the purpose of an easement is not transfer-
able to a different use, and if the purpose of the easement ceases then 
the owner of the fee absorbs the abandoned easement upon termina-
tion of the originally granted use.10 In other words, the government 
                                                                                                                  
Takings Litigation in the Post-Brandt Trust Era, 39 VT. L. REV. 703, 705-06 & n.17 (2015) 
(focusing largely on takings-related implications of the case) [hereinafter Wright, Doing a 
Double Take]; Hannah Christian, Comment, Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United 
States: Turning a National Asset into a Private Gain, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 363, 398 (2015) 
(lamenting the loss of the new uses to which railroad easements might be put if the federal 
government could only retain a reversionary interest and proclaiming the “unjust[]” conver-
sion of “a unique national asset created for the public benefit”); Justin G. Cook, Comment, 
How the Supreme Court Jeopardized Thousands of Miles of Abandoned Railroad Tracks with 
a Single Opinion [Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014)], 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 227 (2014) (arguing that Brandt adversely affects the rails-to-trails system); 
Ernest Thompson, Student Article, The Disappearing Railroad Easement Blues: Riding the 
Rails of Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 60 S.D. L. REV. 308, 312-15 
(2015) (showing basic case summary with a focus on assisting practitioners with related tak-
ings clause issues); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Brandt Revocable Trust: A Victory for Private 
Landowners in Abandoned Railroad Right-of-Way Case, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2014, at 
10 (showing basic case summary with analysis for other railroad easement cases); Norman 
A. Dupont, The Supreme Court Decides Rails to Trails Case: A New Governmental Attorney 
Estoppel Doctrine or a Case of Revisionist History?, TRENDS, July/Aug. 2014, at 9 (providing 
basic case summary); Danaya C. Wright, A New Era of Lavish Land Grants: Taking Public 
Property for Private Use and Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, PROB. & PROP., 
Sept./Oct. 2014, at 30 (focusing on takings) [hereinafter Wright, A New Era], 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_magazine_2012/2014/septem-
ber_october_2014/2014_aba_rpte_pp_v28_5_article_wright_lavish_land_grants.html. Pro-
fessor Wright also wrote an article appearing before the decision. See Danaya C. Wright, 
Reliance Interests and Takings Liability for Rail-Trail Conversions: Marvin M. Brandt Rev-
ocable Trust v. United States, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10173 (2014) [Wright, Reliance Interests]. 
Another law review article provides a useful and relatively impartial analysis. See Shelley 
Ross Saxer, “Rails-to-Trails” Potential Impact of Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. 
United States, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 345, 361-67 (2014). One law review article has been 
published that supports the decision. See Brian T. Hodges, When the Common Law Runs 
into the Constitution: The Train Wreck Avoided in Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. 
United States, 39 VT. L. REV. 673, 675-76 (2015) (discussing impacts on takings and rails-to-
trails, and defending the decision’s protections for certainty and predictability in land titles). 
 8. Wright, A New Era, supra note 7, at 30. 
 9. 134 S. Ct. at 1263.  
 10. Id.  
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cannot reserve an easement for one use and decades later convert it 
(without re-bargaining or paying more) to a different use that was not 
anticipated, expected, or bargained for at the time of the original trans-
fer. The land grant’s provisions must be determinate and not subject 
to one party’s choice to expand its rights under it. In some ways, this 
seems intuitive. But as the Brandt case and others illustrate, applica-
tion of what I am calling the determinacy norm has sometimes become 
a more complex question in practice (and perhaps unnecessarily so).   
 The inattention to Brandt in existing literature is undeserved, as 
the case teaches us very valuable lessons about the rules for interpre-
tation of deeds that are necessary to an effectively functioning system 
of private property.11 In part, the very limited coverage may be because 
the case is seen on the surface as one about railroad rights-of-way—a 
fairly limited and somewhat obscure area of concern. Yet, in the sub-
structure of the Brandt opinion—while hardly expressly discussed by 
the Court—is a necessary recognition of, and respect for, the determi-
nacy norm in the interpretation of deeds. This Article explores and re-
veals that largely hidden substructure. Thus, while Brandt is interest-
ing and important on its own particulars, what is especially enlighten-
ing for this Article’s purposes is the opinion’s implicit endorsement of 
the determinacy norm. Especially when read in light of the other re-
cent cases, Brandt reveals a pattern of U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in which the Court itself is not adequately articulating where 
the determinacy norm is present (even when not expressly stated as 
such). 
 As a brief introductory aside, it should be noted here that this Arti-
cle will use the term “deeds” broadly, sometimes with the intention of 
including within it similar legal instruments that have the same effect 
but a different name—principally statutory land grants, government 
patents, and statutory reservations. Statutory grants and reservations 
and government-issued land patents are, in most respects, subject to 
the same rules of interpretation that we apply to deeds between pri-
vate individuals.12 The only substantial difference between the two is 
that ambiguities in deeds are construed against the grantor (at least 
when the grantor is the drafter)13 while ambiguities in land grants 
                                                                                                                  
 11. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 674 (“The Brandt decision . . . is certainly destined for 
property law textbooks.”); id. at 695-96 (“The implications of the Supreme Court’s decision 
are far-reaching. The common law relies on a predictable and well-understood system for 
characterizing the various types of interests in property.”). 
 12. GEORGE W. THOMPSON, 5B COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 2725, at 383 (1978); Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478, 491 (1865) (“[T]he patent 
[land grant authorized by statute] is a deed of the United States.”). 
 13. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN 
INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, § 6.1, at 129 (6th ed. 2005) (“A deed is always construed most 
strongly against the grantor who has used the language.”). 
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from the government are construed in favor of the sovereign.14 Thus, 
what this Article concludes for deeds mostly applies to grants, patents, 
and reservations, and vice versa. 
 Part II explains the determinacy norm and the rules of interpreta-
tion that collectively follow or flow from that norm. Part III presents a 
series of examples from U.S. Supreme Court opinions were the deter-
minacy norm is not expressly iterated but is nonetheless present and 
crucial to the Court’s holdings. All of the examples are chosen because 
they fall in a line of statutory grant and land patent cases similar to 
the recent decision in Brandt. Very curiously, though, the Court itself 
has done a very poor job tying these cases together and recognizing 
their similarities. In fact, some of these cases were not even cited in 
Brandt while others received only passing reference. There appears to 
be a lack of comprehension of a thread that binds these cases together, 
and this Article seeks to remedy that failing. The principal cases dis-
cussed in Part III include Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,15 Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe,16 and BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. 
United States.17 Part IV follows with a discussion of Brandt and its les-
sons for the determinacy norm in deed interpretation.  
 While hardly an exhaustive list of U.S. Supreme Court cases where 
the deed-based determinacy norm lurks in the background, these cases 
discussed in Parts III and IV are able educators of the presence of the 
norm in our jurisprudence. There are very important lessons in these 
cases regarding the vitality of the determinacy norm and the lessons 
of Leo Sheep.18 Part V reflects on the benefits of the fierce application 
of a determinacy norm in deed interpretation, explaining that the ef-
fective functioning, indeed the very existence, of the property system 
is dependent on vigorous adherence to the norm and the values it aims 
to foster. This Article concludes that we should more directly recognize 
the determinacy norm’s presence in deed and land grant cases, so that 
we may better synthesize our understanding and application of deed-
based jurisprudence and more effectively promote the utility of our 
deed-based private property system. 
                                                                                                                  
 14. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (describing “the estab-
lished rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes 
except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for 
the Government, not against it”).  
 15. 462 U.S. 36 (1983). 
 16. 526 U.S. 865 (1999). 
 17. 541 U.S. 176 (2004). 
 18. 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979). 
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II.   DEFINING THE DETERMINACY NORM RELATING  
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPERTY DEEDS  
AND EQUIVALENT LAND GRANTS 
 Property deeds must have a fixed meaning, identifiable at the time 
of the conveyance, and it is this meaning that a court seeks to find 
when interpreting them.19 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in the 
1867 case of Cavazos v. Trevino, when construing a grant, a court 
should assess the language of the deed and the “the attendant and sur-
rounding circumstances, at the time it was made, . . . for the purpose 
of placing the court in the same situation, and giving it the same ad-
vantages for construing the paper, which were possessed by the actors 
themselves.”20 The Cavazos Court further explained that the “object 
and effect” of this exercise is “not to contradict or vary the terms of the 
instrument, but to enable the court to arrive at the proper conclusion 
as to its meaning and the understanding and intention of the par-
ties.”21 It is a court’s job to put itself in the situation of the parties at 
the time of conveyance and to discern the intent of the parties in a 
manner that sustains the life, at a later date, of the meaning that was 
attached to the deed at that earlier, critical moment in time when the 
meaning was birthed. It is this task that makes the deed determinate. 
In his noteworthy Treatise on the Law of Deeds, Robert Devlin reported 
on the legal standards that have developed over time requiring that 
“[a] deed should receive a fair and reasonable construction which will 
effectuate the intention of the parties, and a contemporaneous exposi-
tion of the deed is always entitled to the greatest consideration.”22 Sim-
ilar advice regarding the contemporaneous intent-focused nature of 
the inquiry into the meaning of deed terms was stated by Lord Chief 
Baron Eyre in the 1791 opinion in Gibson v. Minet: “Deeds are at the 
common law, they have their operation and their construction by the 
rules of the common law, they are contracts of a more solemn nature   
                                                                                                                  
 19. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 102, § 851, at 128; see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D  
Deeds § 248, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (“In the construction of the language 
used in a deed for the purpose of ascertaining the land conveyed, the intention of the parties, 
especially that of the grantor, as deduced from the whole instrument and the surrounding 
circumstances and conditions is controlling, just as it is in determining any other question 
arising in the construction of the deed.”); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, supra note 4 (“Interpreta-
tion of a deed focuses upon the intention of the parties at the time of the conveyance . . . .”); 
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.05[3][a] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2015) (“The intent of the parties is the polestar for interpreting a deed . . . .”); Hodges, supra 
note 7, at 696 (“The terms used by the common law have precise definitions and a complex 
system of rules flows from those definitions.”). 
 20. 73 U.S. 773, 784 (1867) (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. 
 22. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 851, at 128. 
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than other contracts; between particular parties, respecting particular 
interests, in particular subjects.”23 It is this particularity that makes 
the determinate deeds valuable.   
 This Part probes what we mean by a “determinacy norm” for deed 
interpretation and catalogs some of the rules of interpretation that fur-
ther the norm, like those described above. “Determinacy” is defined in 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as “the quality or state of being determi-
nate” and “the state of being definitely and unequivocally character-
ized: exactness.”24 Individuals engaging in transactions associated 
with property, particularly those who place a reliance on deeds (includ-
ing, but not limited to, buyers), demand this “exactness” and ability to 
predict the scope of the ownership interests of any one property 
“owner.” “Determinate” is similarly defined as “definitely known or de-
cided” and “definitely settled.”25 In this sense, the determinacy norm in 
property law reflects many of the same values as the rule of law gen-
erally, including non-retroactivity and the inability to change the rules 
of the game as time goes on.26 The focus on interpreting the meaning 
of deeds “at the time of conveyance”27 is key because it sets a temporal 
point where exactness is decided and when matters of the deed are 
“definitely settled,” after which they are not to be disturbed lest we 
enter the realm of indeterminacy. 
 Although not much discussion regarding the determinacy of deeds 
exists in the literature, there is a rich discussion regarding indetermi-
nacy of law generally—questioning whether law can be objective and 
provide single answers to questions—from which some insights can be 
                                                                                                                  
 23. Gibson v. Minet (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 326 (HL) 351 (appeal taken from Eng.) (em-
phasis added). The rules for property law and the regard for property rights have deep roots 
in the origins of the common law. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 
(“The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists 
in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or dimi-
nution, save only by the laws of the land. The origin of private property is probably founded 
in nature . . . .”); ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 107 (1966) (“[C]ommon 
law of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is in large part the law of land and tenures, the 
law of property rights . . . . A glance at the chapters of Magna Carta or at any collection of 
common-law writs will reveal the dominant concern with rights in land . . . .”). 
 24. Determinacy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
determinacy (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 25. Determinate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
determinate (last visited Feb. 16, 2016). 
 26. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 656 (1829) (Story, J.) (discussing 
the “danger, inconvenience and mischiefs of retrospective legislation in general,” including 
its effects in “disturb[ing] the security of titles”). 
 27. 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 202, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 
2015) (“Deeds generally are subject to the same rules of construction as are applied to con-
tracts. The primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the parties as expressed in the  
deed . . . . The rights of the parties are determined by the law as it exists at the time of the 
conveyance.”) (emphasis added); see also DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 102-03 (“As in the 
case of all contracts, the intent of the parties to the deed, when it can be obtained from the 
instrument, will prevail, unless counteracted by some rule of law.”). 
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borrowed to explain my use of the term “determinacy” regarding deeds. 
For example, Kent Greenawalt compares the definition of determinacy 
to what we mean by the rule of law, positing that determinacy in law 
means one finds the answer in the law: 
Here the “rule of law” idea connects to my basic standard for a de-
terminate answer. The main criterion for judging the existence of a 
determinate answer is whether virtually any intelligent person fa-
miliar with the legal system would conclude, after careful study, 
that the law provides that answer. This standard reflects well the 
notion that the answer exists independently of either individual id-
iosyncrasies or controversial moral and political judgments.28 
 One can analogize Greenawalt’s definition to the meaning of deter-
minacy in deed interpretation by saying that the answer to the deed’s 
meaning lies in the deed, which is infused with the ingredients of the 
terms used by the parties and their corresponding intent at the time 
that the deed—like the law—was written and executed such that it 
provided the answer then and always. With this focus on temporal and 
constant meaning, the lessons of Douglass North are applicable here 
as well when he concludes that “[s]ecure property rights will require 
political and judicial organizations that effectively and impartially en-
force contracts across space and time.”29 The meaning of the terms in 
a deed begins and remains with the deed—forever set “across space 
and time” from the point of conveyance—and is not later found in some 
other point of authority, opinion, or competing value. 
 Consider also another definition of the indeterminacy of law gener-
ally. Again, the context for the following statements is the debate over 
whether law itself suffers from indeterminacy (i.e., it lacks the charac-
teristics of objectivity, neutrality, etc.), but there are lessons that can 
be drawn for the definition of deed determinacy. Ken Kress articulates 
that “[l]aw is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack sin-
gle right answers. In adjudication, law is indeterminate to the extent 
that authoritative legal materials and methods permit multiple out-
comes to lawsuits.”30 Accepting this reasoning, deeds are indetermi-
nate if we do not ground their interpretation in a set of rules that work 
to induce judges to find a single right answer based in a definite source 
of authority. With deeds, that source of authority is the deed itself and 
the intent of the parties as judged by the deed terms and other evi-
dence of intent that existed contemporaneously with the execution of 
                                                                                                                  
 28. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). 
 29. NORTH, supra note 3, at 121. 
 30. Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989). 
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the deed.31 So, whereas Kress says of the metrics for evaluating the 
determinacy of law in general that “[l]aw is indeterminate where the 
correct theory of legal reasoning fails to yield a right answer or permits 
multiple answers to legal questions,”32 the deed interpretation rules 
discussed here and below are at the very least attempting to create a 
theory of legal reasoning that prohibits multiple answers to the mean-
ing of a deed. 
 Finally, let us consider Lawrence Solum’s definitions of indetermi-
nacy in the debate over the general nature of law and legal systems. 
Solum provides definitions for three key terms. First, he argues that 
“[t]he law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the 
set of results that can be squared with the legal materials contains one 
and only one result.”33 In contrast, Solum posits that “[t]he law is inde-
terminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results 
in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is identical 
with the set of all imaginable results.”34 The point here is that indeter-
minacy will exist if one is not constrained in the choice of result. Where 
there are no rules for deed interpretation to constrain a judge’s pool of 
available interpretations down to one, the deeds that would be inter-
preted would suffer from indeterminacy. Thus, if we wish to foster de-
terminacy in deeds, the rules of interpretation for deeds should be, and 
are, designed to limit the possible meanings given to a deed term to 
one and only one meaning. Of course, the law may strive for absolute 
determinacy and fall short yet not entirely devolve into indeterminacy. 
Thus, Solum proposes that “[t]he law is underdeterminate with respect 
to a given case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be 
squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of 
all imaginable results.”35 Using this definition of “underdeterminate” 
and recognizing that rules limiting choice of interpretation are imper-
fect and may not always be followed, it may be that, in practice, the 
legal system generally and deed interpretation in particular is better 
characterized as falling in this underdeterminate category. I will leave 
exploration of that debate for another day. Instead, my focus in this 
Article is to defend the proposition that the deed interpretation rules 
are at least structured with the goal of determinacy in mind and that 
they seek to operate as a constraint designed to limit judges to a single 
(closed set of one) interpretation of any particular deed. 
                                                                                                                  
 31. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 103-04 (“The rule is that the intention of the parties 
is to be ascertained by considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as the situation of 
the parties, and then to give effect to such intention if practicable when not contrary to law.”). 
 32. Kress, supra note 30, at 320. 
 33. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (emphasis omitted). 
 34. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 35. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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 The meaning of determinacy of deed interpretation is also informed 
by understanding the relationship between determinacy and the rule 
of law. There are substantial similarities between the importance 
served by a determinacy norm for deed interpretation and the goals 
sought by embracing rule of law values, including determinacy.  
 The rule of law includes the freedom from what John Locke calls 
the “inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will” of others.36 As Jo-
seph Story has explained, it is particularly important that rule of law 
values dominate when it comes to private property concerns: 
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become 
utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable 
power over the private fortune of every citizen. One of the funda-
mental objects of every good government must be the due admin-
istration of justice; and how vain it would be to speak of such an 
administration, when all property is subject to the will or caprice of 
the legislature, and the rulers.37 
Thomas Morgan and Robert Tuttle explain the utility and necessity of 
being able to discern the law’s meaning and boundaries, stating that 
“[i]n order to act freely within their protected realm and to participate 
effectively in cooperative acts, individuals must know ‘with fair cer-
tainty’ what the law is.”38 They continue that “[i]f the law is radically 
indeterminate, official discretion will not be bounded, individual free-
dom will not be secure, and social interaction will become infinitely 
more complex.”39 These conclusions regarding the dangers when the 
rule of law is absent are equally applicable to what would happen if we 
fail to respect a determinacy norm for deeds. Freedom to exchange or 
invest in property is insecure when we do not know whether our deed 
rights will be enforced.40 Social interaction, including conveying and 
                                                                                                                  
 36. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). Consider Locke’s description of the protection against arbitrary or 
indeterminate rules: 
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, com-
mon to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; 
a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and 
not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another 
man . . . .  
 This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely 
joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits 
his preservation and life together . . . . 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 37. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED  
STATES § 1784, at 661 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). 
 38. Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 5, at 1012. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
335 (J. Kahane trans., Liberty Fund 1981) (1936) (“The desire for an increase of wealth can 
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contracting property rights, is more complex when the reliance and 
confidence regarding the enforceability of deed rights necessary to in-
centivize productive behavior and investment are diminished.  
 Drawing from these definitions, it seems clear that to achieve de-
terminacy in the interpretation of deeds, courts must adopt rules that 
ensure that the ownership and the scope of one’s deed rights are set-
tled, knowable, and known from the point of the deed’s execution. Per-
haps most importantly, we must judge the meaning of deed terms in 
private conveyances, and in statutory land grants, at the time of the 
conveyance or grant, in accordance with the intent of the private par-
ties to an agreement, or the intent and expectations of the government 
and its patentees, when dealing with language in a statutory land 
grant or patent.41 Without these standards to foster determinacy, prop-
erty owners would be left with little security in the rights held through 
their deeds, and the system of property law would lack the legitimacy 
it requires.42 
 Both the rule of law and determinacy norms seek to add a sense of 
established and knowable standards upon which individuals can pre-
dict enforceability of rules and adjust their behaviors43 and where gov-
ernment officials, including judges, are constrained from upsetting ex-
pectations and the justifiable reliance individuals place on pre-set 
rules.44 Friedrich Hayek, for example, explains that the rule of law 
“means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with 
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.”45 
                                                                                                                  
be satisfied through exchange, which is the only method possible in a capitalist economy, or 
by violence and petition as in a militarist society, where the strong acquire by force, the weak 
by petitioning.”). 
 41. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 191, supra note 4 (“Courts may determine the intent of the par-
ties in a disputed deed with reference to the position of the parties at the time of conveyance 
and in light of surrounding circumstances, and resort to rules of construction.”); cf. 
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 38 (“The claim that the law can yield determinate answers is 
most straightforward with respect to simple statutory texts.”). 
 42. Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 5, at 1011-12 (“The legitimacy of the rule of law in  
a pluralistic society is usually taken to depend on two of its features, neutrality and  
determinacy.”). 
 43. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) 
(“[M]any conceptions of the Rule of Law place great emphasis on legal certainty, predictabil-
ity, and settlement; on the determinacy of the norms that are upheld in society; and on the 
reliable character of their administration by the state.”). 
 44. See id. (“The Rule of Law is a multi-faceted ideal. Most conceptions of this ideal, 
however, give central place to a requirement that people in positions of authority should 
exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, rather than on the 
basis of their own preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and 
wrong.”). 
 45. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944). 
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 The basis of legitimacy for a government begins with the rule of 
law,46 which can be defined as having the following characteristics 
within the legal system: (1) clear, known, and understandable laws, 
rules, and regulations; (2) predictability and certainty of enforcement, 
application, and the protection of rights and remedies for wrongs; (3) 
procedural validity and regularity in the establishment of laws, rules, 
and regulations; (4) fair and equal, non-biased application of the laws, 
rules, and regulations; and (5) freedom from arbitrary, capricious, or 
ad hoc decisions that make the law so indeterminate and unestab-
lished as to make predictable compliance impossible.47 
 Consider the recent counsel of the Michigan Supreme Court on the 
virtues of predictable and stable interpretations of property rights.48 It 
began by quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation in Payne v. 
Tennessee regarding the general benefits of stare decisis effects in law 
that, “[i]n approaching any case, ‘[s]tare decisis is the preferred course 
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent de-
velopment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial pro-
cess.’ ”49 The court then continued that “if there is any realm within 
which the values served by stare decisis—stability, predictability, and 
continuity—must be most certainly maintained, it must be within the 
realm of property law,” especially because of the extensive reliance 
parties place on the “establish[ed] ‘rules of property.’ ”50 As the Michi-
gan Supreme Court had accurately explained in a previous case, 
                                                                                                                  
 46. See Waldron, supra note 43, at 3 (“The Rule of Law is one of the most important 
political ideals of our time. It is one of a cluster of ideals constitutive of modern political 
morality, the others being human rights, democracy, and perhaps also the principles of free 
market economy.”) (footnote omitted). 
 47. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 1-22 (2001); see LON L. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (noting the ways in which a system of legal rules 
may fail, resulting in not only a flawed legal system, but a nonexistent legal system); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235, 237 (4th prtg. 1972) (“A legal system is a coercive order 
of public rules . . . . When these rules are just they establish a basis for legitimate expecta-
tions. . . . [A]ctions which the rules of law require and forbid should be of a kind which [indi-
viduals] can reasonably be expected to do and to avoid.”). Waldron summarizes Fuller’s ideas 
as follows: 
 A conception of the Rule of Law like the one just outlined emphasizes the 
virtues that Lon Fuller discussed in The Morality of Law: the prominence of gen-
eral norms as a basis of governance; the clarity, publicity, stability, consistency, 
and prospectivity of those norms; and congruence between the law on the books 
and the way in which public order is actually administered. 
Waldron, supra note 43, at 7. 
 48. 2000 Baum Family Tr. v. Babel, 793 N.W.2d 633, 655 (Mich. 2010). 
 49. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (citing Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 
827 (1991)). 
 50. Id. (citing Bott v. Comm’n of Nat. Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 849 (Mich. 1982)). 
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“[j]udicial ‘rules of property’ create value, and the passage of time in-
duces a belief in their stability that generates commitments of human 
energy and capital.”51 Predictable interpretation of determinate deeds 
operates much like stare decisis in producing these benefits of stability 
in the property system. 
 If an owner is in a dispute with someone contesting the terms of a 
deed, there is no security or confidence in the owner’s ability to prove 
the legitimacy of her rights under the deed unless there is a neutral 
state enforcement system that is searching for a determinate answer 
to the meaning of the deed’s terms. 
 The security one feels in her deed rights is directly proportional to 
the level of confidence she has in this process. Her property will dimin-
ish in value if she lacks the ability to confidently and accurately predict 
how the neutral enforcement system will adjudicate disputes over the 
deed.52 So, too, will a buyer or investor’s incentives change based on 
what degree of accuracy exists for assessing the judicial interpretation 
risks associated with investments in or acquisition of property. Thus, 
our legal system provides the opportunity to prove ownership and op-
erates to adjudicate the rights articulated in the terms of deeds on the 
basis of set and known rules. 
 By further examining a few well-established rules for the interpre-
tation of deeds we can see that the formulation of these rules can be 
justified as furthering the determinacy norm for deed interpretation. 
Deeds are law by private ordering, and as such they need rule of law 
values to govern their interpretation if such ordering is to be effective. 
Critical amongst those rule of law values at play with deed interpreta-
tion is knowability. Knowable deed rights are necessary to predict and 
structure investment. As Hayek has explained in relation to the deter-
minacy aspects of the rule of law generally:  
The rationale of securing to each individual a known range within 
which he can decide on his actions is to enable him to make the full-
est use of his knowledge . . . . The law tells him what facts he may 
count on and thereby extends the range within which he can predict 
the consequences of his actions.53  
  
                                                                                                                  
 51. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 849. 
 52. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 697 (discussing Brandt and positing that “[i]f courts 
are unwilling to give effect to titles, then the owners’ interests and expectations in their 
property become potentially worthless”).  
 53. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960). 
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Individuals tailor their behavior to their expectations created by the 
division of rights they perceive manifest in the executed deeds. The 
less stable the expectations, the less likely one will invest in the acqui-
sition or improvement of property.54 
 Courts routinely focus on the well-established rule that the intent 
of the parties governs the interpretation of deeds. The purpose of deed 
interpretation is to identify “the object had in view by the parties.”55 As 
the rules that have developed for deed interpretation clearly state, the 
task for the interpreting judge is to ascertain intent, focusing in on the 
law, language, situation, and circumstances “when the instrument 
was framed.”56 The aim is to give a deed a fixed meaning from a fixed 
time forward, with enforceability tied to that moment and adjudication 
aimed at finding the meaning of the deed’s terms as of that historical 
moment. And, through private ordering, private law accomplishes the 
adjustment of property rights through deeds; thus the intent and de-
sires of the private parties affected—or, the “law” that they have cho-
sen to regulate the allocation of property rights between them—should 
dictate the interpretation of their agreements.57 
 The fact that courts try to resolve the meaning and identify the in-
tent as expressed in and based on the text alone whenever possible58 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See Waldron, supra note 43, at 6-7. Waldron explains one account of the rule of law 
as stressing the ties between the ability to predict legal outcomes, expectations, and willing-
ness to invest as follows: 
 On this account, the Rule of Law is violated when . . . officials act on the basis 
of their own discretion rather than norms laid down in advance. If actions of this 
sort become endemic, then not only are people’s expectations disappointed, but 
they will increasingly find themselves unable to form any expectations at all,  
and the horizons of their planning and their economic activity will diminish  
accordingly. 
Id. 
 55. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 429, supra note 4 (explaining the rules for construing restrictions 
on the use of property and that “effect is to be given to the intention of the parties, as shown 
by the language of the instrument, considered in connection with the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, and the object had in view by the parties”) (footnote omitted). 
 56. See Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300, 310 (1888). In Colton, the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained: 
The object . . . of a judicial interpretation of [every written instrument] is to as-
certain the intention of the testator [or grantor], according to the meaning of the 
words he has used, deduced from a consideration of the whole instrument and a 
comparison of its various parts in the light of the situation and circumstances 
which surrounded the testator [or grantor] when the instrument was framed. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 181, supra note 4 (“[T]he construction of a 
deed must be governed by the strict rules of the common law, and the governing law at the 
time of conveyance.”) (footnote omitted). 
 57. See 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, supra note 4 (“The main object in construing a deed is 
to ascertain the intention of the parties.”). 
 58. See Van Ness v. Mayor of Wash., 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 232, 285 (1830) (“Here we have a 
solemn instrument embodying the final intentions and agreements of the parties, without 
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is another important determinacy norm-based rule. First, judicial 
rules that focus on the text of the document for ascertaining intent 
incentivize parties to memorialize their intent in precise, revealing, 
and informative text. The judicial interpretation rules route behavior. 
Thus, it incentivizes complete and clearer drafting when the parties 
know that judges and others will look first to the language in the trans-
fer documents when interpreting deeds. Second, the focus on the text 
reflects our desire as a society to have set rules and an identifiable 
place where persons outside the transaction transferring the property 
(and not just judges) can ascertain the respective rights of the parties.59  
 Intent matters because it is what the parties themselves are most 
intimately associated with and most capable of discovering between 
themselves in order to evaluate their respective rights and tailor their 
behaviors to the property and the rights, immunities, liabilities and 
obligations associated with the land transaction.60 When interpreting 
the terms of a conveyance that have “natural meaning” and when the 
parties use “appropriate terms of art” understood within property law 
to express their meaning and intent, then that determinate meaning 
controls, and the court cannot “defeat the legal meaning, and resort to 
a conjectural intent.”61 The courts cannot ignore the will of the private 
parties as expressed in the terms of the deed by construing them any 
other way.62 To do so would, in the words of Lord Eyre, which were 
later incorporated in an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, mean that 
“we no longer construe men’s deeds, but make deeds for them,”63 which 
is a line the courts cannot cross. 
                                                                                                                  
any allegation of mistake; and we are to construe that instrument according to the legal 
import of its terms.”); see also 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 195, supra note 4 (“The primary rule in 
construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties from the deed itself, construed 
as a whole.”) (footnote omitted); 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 163, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 
2015) (“A court will give effect to the intention of the parties to instruments conveying a 
right-of-way or other interests to a railroad as far as can be ascertained from the  
instrument.”). 
 59. See Gisborn v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 142 U.S. 326, 331-36 (1892) (showing 
terms of written instruments arrived at by having the parties determine their rights). 
 60. See HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 13, § 6.1, at 128 (“The purpose of construing 
a conveyance or will when its terms are ambiguous is to determine the intention of the par-
ties. All rules of construction are subservient to this purpose. In other words, the first rule 
of construction is to give effect to the parties’ intent.”). 
 61. Van Ness, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 285 (“How then can the court defeat the legal meaning, 
and resort to a conjectural intent?”). 
 62. See id. at 286 (“But it is sufficient for us, that here there is a solemn conveyance, 
which purports to grant an unlimited fee . . . and we know of no authority which would justify 
us in disregarding the terms, or limiting their import, where no mistake is set up and none 
is established.”). 
 63. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 86 (1875) (quoting Lord Chief Baron 
Eyre in Gibson v. Minet, (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 326 (HL) 351 (appeal taken from Eng.)) (adding 
that “[t]his rule is as applicable to a statute as to a deed”). 
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 Thus, based on these stated rules of interpretation and the survey 
of the way courts themselves have historically treated the search for 
meaning in deed terms, I repeat from the introduction the formulation 
of the summary for what can be called the determinacy norm for the 
interpretation of deeds: In order to satisfy the determinacy norm, courts 
must interpret the terms in deeds and land grants as having a fixed 
meaning set contemporaneously with the transfer and based on the dis-
cernable intent and expectations of the parties at the time of the convey-
ance or grant. With that formulation in view, an analysis of the cases 
in the next two Parts begins to reveal the yet-obscured threads that 
bind them together. Each holding can be justified based on interpretive 
rules that reflect the determinacy norm.  
III.   SELECTED PRE-BRANDT EXAMPLES OF UNSTATED  
U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION  
OF THE DETERMINACY NORM 
 This Part identifies several examples from U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions in which the interpretive foundations of the determinacy 
norm are applied. The Court appears to be following a trend that it has 
not yet articulated (at least not with any sense of clarity). Each of the 
examples in this Part have similarities with Brandt, although the 
Brandt opinion hardly cited them. 
 Because property is traditionally a state law issue, the U.S.  
Supreme Court hears few cases involving the interpretation of deeds. 
When it has engaged in such interpretation of deeds, it has normally 
followed the determinacy norm-based interpretive rules, as some of the 
example cases in Part II illustrate. More often, the Court is called upon 
to interpret federal statutory land grants (and reservations) and land 
patents.   
 After all this talk about “deeds” so far in this Article, some readers 
may wonder why this Part is so heavily focused on the interpretation 
of statutory land grants and land patents. The answer is basic. As you 
may recall from the introduction, courts adopt the same core construc-
tion rules for interpreting statutory land grants and patents (the terms 
we associate with public, or government, conveyances) as they do for 
interpreting deeds (the term we per se associate with private convey-
ances).64 Most often, this Article is using “deeds” loosely as shorthand 
to refer to all of these similar legal instruments. The determinacy norm 
is prevalent in each category in the same way without regard to the 
proper name we give to these documents that secure and establish 
ownership rights depending on the status of the grantor. As noted ear-
lier, there is a bit of a difference in the presumptions that apply in the 
                                                                                                                  
 64. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
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face of ambiguity in these instruments: ambiguities in private deeds 
most often are construed against the grantor when the grantor is the 
drafter, but ambiguities in public land grants are construed in favor of 
the sovereign.65 Neither that distinction nor any other nuances in con-
struction are really consequential for the analysis in this Article. 
 What is important for our purposes is that these cases in this Part 
all show the determinacy norm employed to reach the conclusions in 
the cases, although none of the opinions say directly that the judges 
are doing so. But we can learn from these cases how the determinacy 
norm operates. And whether we look at “deed” cases or “land grant” 
cases to witness the norm’s application is largely inconsequential. Pri-
vate conveyance law can learn from public conveyance law, and the 
same is true in reverse. 
 I have chosen these cases in part because they exemplify the oper-
ation of the determinacy norm (and demonstrate that the courts, un-
fortunately, do not so label it). I have also chosen them because of 
Brandt’s currency. And lastly, I have chosen to focus on these cases 
because their interconnectedness is neither fully recognized by the 
Court nor by the literature, and that deficit is really something worth 
correcting. 
 Thus, one ancillary purpose of this Part, separate from the goal of 
elucidating the determinacy norm, is to, for the first time, present 
these cases together so that one can see how closely related they are 
as a matter of land grant interpretation and natural resources law. 
That alone makes the collection of cases interesting. The cases pre-
sented below also provide excellent case studies in the application of 
the determinacy norm while failing to expressly say so. Finally, please 
note that this is an illustrative, rather than an exhaustive, collection 
of Supreme Court analysis on these issues. Through this collection, 
however, it should be clear that the determinacy norm is vibrant in 
deed and land grant jurisprudence. 
A.   Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 
 In Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,66 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983 
was required to interpret a mineral reservation in land patented under 
the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (“SRHA”),67 which “provided 
for the settlement of homesteads on lands the surface of which was 
                                                                                                                  
 65. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (describing “the established rule that land 
grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes except what is con-
veyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for the Government, 
not against it” (citing Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919))); see also supra 
notes 13-14 and accompanying text.  
 66. 462 U.S. 36 (1983). 
 67. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1970) (repealed 1976). 
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‘chiefly valuable for grazing and raising crops’ and ‘not susceptible of 
irrigation from any known source of water supply.’ ”68 As mentioned 
earlier, a land “patent” is essentially the term used in the place of 
“deed” when the “conveying” of real property is done by the federal 
government granting the property to a private individual.69 When 
granting property through land patents issued pursuant to the SRHA, 
the statute provided that “all the coal and other minerals” were re-
served and owned by the United States.70 In the Western Nuclear case, 
the question became whether gravel was one of the “other minerals” 
reserved and belonging to the United States or, alternatively, whether 
that gravel belonged to the patentee who received all property rights 
except those reserved.71 
 Importantly, the Court attempted to find a definitive meaning from 
dictionaries or “legal understanding of the term ‘minerals’ that pre-
vailed in 1916.”72 This effort illustrates the Court’s recognition of the 
obligation to seek to find a determinate meaning when possible that is 
tied to the time of the deed’s execution or the statutory grant’s passage 
into law. Ultimately, the Court found those sources wanting,73 but it 
did interpret the meaning and scope of “other minerals” by relying on 
“the purposes of the SRHA”74 which existed in the statute and thus 
were present and discoverable by the parties at the time of the trans-
fer’s authorization and forever set for the future. In other words, the 
source of the patent’s interpretation (the SRHA) had a fixed meaning 
at the fixed time of the SRHA enactment and within the fixed and 
knowable purposes of the SRHA. The Court’s focus was on what “Con-
gress plainly contemplated”75 in the terms and what “Congress plainly 
expected”76 as well as what “Congress certainly could not have ex-
pected”77 regarding the usages of the lands patented at the time it cre-
ated the SRHA land grant scheme.  
 Although the Court never expressly stated it, it seemed to hint at 
least that the SRHA patentees themselves also could not have ex-
pected that they would get rights to the gravel because the purposes 
                                                                                                                  
 68. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 292). 
 69. See Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2014) (“A land 
patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made public, or  
‘patent.’ ”). 
 70. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 299). 
 71. See id. at 37-38. 
 72. Id. at 46-47. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 47. 
 75. Id. at 51. 
 76. Id. at 53. 
 77. Id. at 55; see also id. at 47 (making a conclusion “[s]ince Congress could not have 
expected”). 
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of their grants did not include mining. The Court engaged in a lengthy 
evaluation of Congress’s knowledge of mineral law as of 1916 (the time 
of enactment of the SRHA) and its intent and expectations for the 
SRHA78 before concluding that “[w]hatever the precise scope of the 
mineral reservation may be, we are convinced that it includes 
gravel.”79 Whether one agrees with the majority’s assessment of what 
Congress intended or what it meant, there is no doubt that the major-
ity believed that it was required to identify Congress’s intent and ex-
pectations at the time of the SRHA enactment in order to determine 
the respective rights of the parties. For example, it concluded that 
“Congress could not have expected that stockraising and raising crops 
would entail the extraction of gravel deposits from the land,”80 and 
thus “the congressional purpose of facilitating the concurrent develop-
ment of both surface and subsurface resources is best served by con-
struing the mineral reservation to encompass gravel.”81 The Court sup-
ported its interpretation by employing “the established rule that land 
grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes 
except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts 
they are resolved for the Government, not against it”82 and by relying 
on legislative history.83 All in all, Western Nuclear is an example of a 
case where, although the Court could not find completely unambigu-
ous intent, it nonetheless worked extremely hard to try to get to that 
point with an understanding of the importance of setting a meaning 
that existed and became effective upon enactment of the SRHA and 
that would also have been understood by Congress and the patentee 
at that time too. That exercise was in the spirit of following the deter-
minacy norm. 
B.   Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe 
 In Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe,84 the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1999 interpreted the scope of land patents issued 
pursuant to the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 (collectively “Coal 
Land Acts”) and in so doing had occasion to employ interpretative rules 
that underlay what I am here calling the determinacy norm. The  
patents under the Coal Land Acts “conveyed to the patentee the land 
and everything in it, except the ‘coal,’ which was reserved to the United 
                                                                                                                  
 78. Id. at 48-56. 
 79. Id. at 55. 
 80. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 59 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 
116 (1957)).  
 83. Id. at 60. 
 84. 526 U.S. 865 (1999). 
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States.”85 Inside coal seams, there is often present another mineral 
known as coal bed methane (“CBM”).86 So, the Court was required, 
when interpreting the reservation, to determine whether the term 
“coal” (covering the reserved property in the patent belonging to the 
United States) included CBM.87 It held that CBM was not part of the 
“coal”—CBM was distinct and thus was included within the patentee’s 
package of ownership.88 In doing so, the Court was again focused on 
finding a determinate meaning at the time of the Coal Lands Acts such 
that the parties could, with confidence, identify the state of ownership 
at the time the Acts passed (and consequently all of this would already 
be known when the patents issued as well).  
 The Court very clearly explained that the interpretation of a land 
grant (or conveyance) cannot be dependent on present-day knowledge 
or current understanding. We must look back at the time of the con-
veyance or grant and try to determine what the parties would have 
expected the boundaries of the transfer to be: 
While the modern science of coal provides a useful backdrop for our 
discussion and is consistent with our ultimate disposition, it does 
not answer the question presented to us. The question is not 
whether, given what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard 
CBM gas as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so regarded 
it in 1909 and 1910. In interpreting statutory mineral reservations 
like the one at issue here, we have emphasized that Congress “was 
dealing with a practical subject in a practical way” and that it in-
tended the terms of the reservation to be understood in “their ordi-
nary and popular sense.” We are persuaded that the common con-
ception of coal at the time Congress passed the 1909 and 1910 Acts 
was the solid rock substance that was the country’s primary energy 
resource.89 
 The Court exhaustively examined both the language and surround-
ing circumstances that would have informed Congress at the time of 
enactment of the Coal Land Acts, noting, among other things, that “[a]t 
the time the Acts were passed, most dictionaries defined coal as the 
solid fuel resource,”90 and thus:  
[T]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not 
have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a   
                                                                                                                  
 85. Id. at 867. 
 86. Id. at 872-73. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See id. at 880. 
 89. Id. at 873-74 (emphasis added) (first quoting Burke v. S. Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669, 
679 (1914); then citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 90. Amoco Prod. Co., 526 U.S. at 874 (emphasis added). 
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solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance 
that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as a part 
of the coal itself.91  
 Therefore, when the United States reserved “coal” for itself, neither 
Congress nor the patentees would have expected that CBM was re-
served. The Court buttressed this interpretation and its “at the time”-
analysis by looking at the surrounding circumstances including the 
practicalities of the subject92 and the fact that, given the “condition of 
the country when the acts were passed,”93 CBM was not even consid-
ered in the same category as coal (a valuable resource) but instead was 
largely considered an uneconomic and “dangerous waste product.”94 All 
of the focus was on identifying a determinate meaning as of the date 
of enactment of the statutes authorizing the patents. Finally, it is im-
portant to note that the Court was confident in its plain meaning in-
terpretation and stated that “[b]ecause we conclude that the most nat-
ural interpretation of ‘coal’ as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not 
encompass CBM gas, we need not consider the applicability of the 
canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the 
sovereign.”95 
C.   BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States 
 In BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,96 the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2004 was required to interpret the meaning of terms in another statu-
tory reservation tied to a statutorily authorized grant of government 
property to a private individual. The Pittman Underground Water Act 
of 1919 (“Pittman Act”) authorized the transfer of a land patent97 to 
                                                                                                                  
 91. Id. at 874-75 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 873 (first citing Burke, 234 U.S. at 679; then citing Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42). 
 93. Id. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 
682 (1979)). 
 94. Id. at 876. 
 95. Id. at 880. This rule finds itself in many court opinions, including this one drawing 
on the lessons of Vattel:  
Vattel’s first general maxim of interpretation is that “it is not allowable to inter-
pret what has no need of interpretation,” and he continues: “When a deed is 
worded in clear and precise terms—when its meaning is evident and leads to no 
absurd conclusion—there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning 
which such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in 
order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it.” Here the words are plain and 
interpret themselves. 
Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526, 534 (1883) (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
244 (John Chitty ed., The Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2006) (1854). 
 96. 541 U.S. 176 (2004). 
 97. Id. at 179; see also Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 
(2014) (“A land patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made 
public, or ‘patent.’ ”). 
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settlers for the purposes of supporting and incentivizing irrigation pro-
jects in the area of the land patents within the State of Nevada.98  
 These grants by statute—the equivalent of legislative “convey-
ances”—had language (as did the express terms of the patent docu-
ment itself) that included a “reservation to the United States of all the 
coal and other valuable minerals in the lands . . . together with the 
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same.”99 The predecessors 
in title to the property owners in the BedRoc case held their Pittman 
Act property subject to this reservation, yet they proceeded to extract 
sand and gravel from that property.100 The United States brought ad-
ministrative actions against the land grant holders, including claiming 
a trespass on the property of the United States.101 The property in ques-
tion was namely the sand and gravel that the government claimed be-
longed to the United States because the sand and gravel were suppos-
edly “valuable minerals” and thus would have been severed from the 
original patent and included in the reservation.102 The owners of the 
property from the land grant filed an action to quiet title to the sand 
and gravel in the U.S. District Court,103 claiming that sand and 
gravel—while valuable today—were not valuable minerals in 1919 
even if they were minerals; and, thus, the expectations of the parties 
(Congress and all prospective patentees) at the time of the statutory 
grant could not have been that sand and gravel were reserved. The 
District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled in favor of government ownership of the sand and gravel pursu-
ant to the reservations in the patent.104 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed and interpreted the patent in favor of the patentees and their 
successors’ claims to ownership of the sand and gravel.105 In doing so, 
the Court reached its decision—again in spirit more than expressly—
within the contours of the determinacy norm.  
 The BedRoc Court explained that the word “valuable” made this 
case distinguishable from Western Nuclear where the language there 
did not have the modifier “valuable” in front of the word “minerals.”106 
The Pittman Act reserved a narrower set of interests for the United 
                                                                                                                  
 98. See BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 179-80. 
 99. Pittman Act, ch. 77, § 8, 41 Stat. 293, 295 (1919) (emphasis added); BedRoc, 541 
U.S. at 179-80 (quoting the granting language from the Act). 
 100. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 180-81. 
 101. Id. at 180. 
 102. Id. at 180-81. 
 103. Id. at 181.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 185-87. 
 106. Id. at 182-83 (“Whatever the correctness of Western Nuclear’s broad construction  
of the term ‘minerals,’ we are not free to so expansively interpret the Pittman Act’s  
reservation.”). 
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States than the set of interests reserved under the SRHA.107 Stated dif-
ferently, a patentee’s package of property rights was larger in a 
Pittman Act-authorized land grant than in an SRHA-authorized land 
grant.  
 The BedRoc Court went on to adopt some of the basic tenets of the 
determinacy norm as it went about identifying the meaning of the 
terms in the patent. First, it explained that Congress’s intent should 
be interpreted based on a presumption that, when drafting, Congress 
was looking at the existing situation and adopting a practical, ordi-
nary, and popular meaning of the terms it used. This presumption re-
garding the method of term choice means that the terms must be 
judged by looking at the then-present circumstances that could be 
identifiable by all relevant stakeholders when setting their expecta-
tions in 1919.108 
 The BedRoc Court emphasized that, “[i]mportantly, the proper in-
quiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the time 
Congress enacted it”109 and quoting Leo Sheep explained that “land-
grant statutes should be interpreted in light of ‘the condition of the 
country when the acts were passed.’ ”110 It further quoted Perrin v. 
United States, noting, “ ‘[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be in-
terpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning’ 
at the time Congress enacted the statute.”111  
 Looking at this contemporaneous understanding, the Court framed 
the central question as being about what the parties could determine 
with a level of determinacy at the time of the patent (i.e., “Because the 
Pittman Act applied only to Nevada, the ultimate question is whether 
the sand and gravel found in Nevada were commonly regarded as ‘val-
uable minerals’ in 1919.”).112 It concluded that “[c]ommon sense tells 
us, and the Government does not contest, that the answer to that ques-
tion is an emphatic ‘No’ ” because sand and gravel were abundant and 
“commercially worthless in 1919 due to Nevada’s sparse population 
and lack of development;”113 and “even if Nevada’s sand and gravel 
                                                                                                                  
 107. Id. (“Here, by contrast [to Western Nuclear], Congress has textually narrowed the 
scope of the term by using the modifier ‘valuable.’ ”). 
 108. See id. at 184 (“In interpreting statutory mineral reservations like the one at issue 
here, we have emphasized that Congress ‘was dealing with a practical subject in a practical 
way’ and that it intended the terms of the reservation to be understood in ‘their ordinary and 
popular sense.’ ” (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873 (1999))). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Amoco, 526 U.S. at 874; then citing Leo Sheep Co. 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979)).  
 110. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 682). 
 111. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 
U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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were regarded as minerals, no one would have mistaken them for val-
uable minerals.”114 The Court flatly rejected the government’s attempt 
to look beyond 1919 or beyond Nevada to tag sand and gravel as valu-
able, because neither set of facts would be relevant to the meaning at-
tached by the parties to the land grant at the time of the Pittman Act’s 
enactment and the patenting in question.115 The Court determined that 
the language was clear and stated, “Because we readily conclude that 
the ‘most natural interpretation’ of the mineral reservation does not 
encompass sand and gravel, we ‘need not consider the applicability of 
the canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the 
sovereign.’ ”116 Nor would it accept the government’s attempt to search 
legislative history because a “contemporaneous plain meaning of the 
Pittman Act’s mineral reservation” indeed existed.117 The parties’ abil-
ity to discern their rights based on the language itself and the circum-
stances present and knowable to them was key in the holding. 
IV.   BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST V. UNITED STATES:  
THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THE DETERMINACY NORM  
AT PLAY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
 The 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandt Revocable Trust 
v. United States118 serves as the latest in a line of cases where the Court 
has recognized the determinacy norm—even though not expressly do-
ing so. An analysis of the case reveals the endorsements within the 
decision for the tenets of the determinacy norm. At issue in the case 
was a railroad right-of-way that was abandoned and the question of 
what happens to that easement after the abandonment.119 As the Court 
explained it:  
This case presents the question of what happens to a railroad’s right 
of way granted under a particular statute—the General Railroad 
Right-of-Way Act of 1875 [“1875 Act”]—when the railroad abandons 
it: does it go to the Government, or to the private party who acquired 
the land underlying the right of way?120  
                                                                                                                  
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 184-85. 
 116. Id. at 185 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999)); 
see also id. at 186-87 (“Having declined to extend Western Nuclear’s rationale to a statute 
where the plain meaning will not support it, we will not allow it in through the back door by 
presuming that ‘the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’ ” 
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))). 
 117. Id. at 186. 
 118. 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014). 
 119. Id. at 1263-64; see also id. at 1262 (“This case requires us to define the nature of the 
interest granted by the 1875 Act, in order to determine what happens when a railroad aban-
dons its right of way.”). 
 120. Id. at 1260. 
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The 1875 Act121 “provided that ‘[t]he right of way through the public 
lands of the United States is granted to any railroad company’ meeting 
certain requirements, ‘to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of 
the central line of said road.’ ”122 At least fifteen special acts granting 
railroad rights-of-way had preceded this “general” 1875 Act, which was 
intended to alleviate the need for constant enactments of “special” 
acts.123 The 1875 Act also had language that was somewhat distinct 
from the earlier acts regarding the rights held by the railroads, making 
some of the past precedent regarding those other acts irrelevant.124  
 In 1976, the United States “patented”—or, in essence, granted—an 
83–acre parcel of land to Melvin and Lulu Brandt, giving them “fee 
simple title to the land ‘with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and 
appurtenances, of whatsoever nature, thereunto belonging, unto said 
claimants, their successors and assigns, forever,’ ”125 with some limited 
exceptions and reservations for rights-of-way held by the United 
States (none of which were at issue in the case). The one reservation 
in the Brandt patent that was at issue in the case was one “stating 
that the land was granted ‘subject to those rights for railroad purposes 
as have been granted to the Laramie[,] Hahn’s Peak & Pacific Railway 
Company [“LHP&P”], its successors or assigns,’ ” but “[t]he patent did 
not specify what would occur if the railroad abandoned this right of 
way.”126 Here, the railroad right-of-way in question “was obtained by 
[LHP&P] in 1908, pursuant to the 1875 Act,” and “[n]early a half-mile 
stretch of the right of way crosses Brandt’s land in Fox Park, covering 
ten acres of that parcel.”127 The LHP&P right-of-way changed owner-
ship many times and the last owner, the Wyoming and Colorado Rail-
road, “notified the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to  
abandon the right of way” in 1996.128 By 2004, the railroad completed 
the abandonment, including tearing up the tracks and ties and receiv-
ing the Surface Transportation Board’s approval to abandon the  
right-of-way.129 
 After abandonment was complete, the United States believed that 
it owned the right-of-way. The United States argued “that it had all 
along retained a reversionary interest in the railroad right of way—
                                                                                                                  
 121. 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2012) (repealed insofar as applicable to the issuance of rights-
of-way over, upon, under, and through the public lands and lands in the National Forest 
System, 1976). 
 122. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1261 (alteration in original) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 934). 
 123. See id.  
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 1262 (quoting the terms of the patent). 
 126. Id. (first alteration in original). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 1263. 
 129. Id. 
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that is, a future estate that would be restored to the United States if 
the railroad abandoned or forfeited its interest.”130 In 2006, it filed an 
action against the owners of thirty-one parcels affected by the LHP&P 
right-of-way, including the Brandts, “seeking a judicial declaration of 
abandonment and an order quieting title in the United States to the 
abandoned right of way.”131 The Brandts were the only owners who 
fought the action; others settled or were subjects of default judgments. 
The Brandts believed that once the property was abandoned by the 
railroads that “the stretch of the right of way crossing his family’s land 
was a mere easement that was extinguished upon abandonment by the 
railroad, so that, under common law property rules, [the Brandts] en-
joyed full title to the land without the burden of the easement.”132  
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the district court ruled in favor of 
the government’s position, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit (although recognizing a division among lower courts 
over the scope of abandoned 1875 Act rights-of-way).133 The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed. 
 Although the patent did not say what would happen when the rail-
road abandoned this right-of-way (nor did the statute), the conse-
quence was nonetheless knowable and should have been known by 
both the patentee and the government through an analysis of the gen-
erally applicable legal principles known to all at the time of the grant 
of the right-of-way, the patent, and the statutory enactments that au-
thorized both. The surrounding legal environment informs the expec-
tations of the parties.   
 In a previous decision, Great Northern Railway Co. v. United 
States,134 the U.S. Supreme Court had already interpreted the 1875 
Act’s rights-of-way and determined that they were basic easements.135 
Thus, here in Brandt, the Court very simply stated that, because these 
are easements held by the railroad and because “[t]he United States 
                                                                                                                  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. The Brandt case is, in many ways, related to a larger body of cases regarding 
“rails-to-trails” legislation and easement conversion efforts. See Saxer, supra note 7, at 351-
62. Those cases usually focused on issues regarding the scope of the easement or whether an 
easement had been abandoned, while the Brandt litigation focused on the nature of the 
rights between the parties based on the deed language. See id. at 362-63. 
 132. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1263. 
 133. Id. Included among the courts holding contrary to the Tenth Circuit opinion in 
United States v. Brandt, 496 F. App’x 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2012), are decisions by the Seventh 
and Federal Circuits. See Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Tr. v. Bayfield Cty., 649 F.3d 799, 803 
(7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 1875 Act gave no indication to patentees or the railroad 
holders of rights-of-way that they should “suspect a lurking governmental right so unsettling 
to the security of private property rights”); Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1314 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (discussing the disposition of lands subject to rights-of-way under the 1875 Act). 
 134. 315 U.S. 262 (1942). 
 135. Id. at 271.  
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did not reserve to itself any interest in the right of way in that pa-
tent,”136 there is a law of easements to be applied and that informs the 
meaning of the rights-of-way as of their creation in 1875. That mean-
ing remained unchanged when the land burdened by the easement was 
transferred from the United States to the Brandts through the 1976 
patent.137 The Great Northern Court clearly identified the interests 
conferred to the railroads in the 1875 Act as easements only, distin-
guishing the 1875 Act as granting a more limited interest than some 
of the prior special rights-of-way acts.138 Great Northern held that the 
1875 Act “clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee,”139 looking at 
the statutory language that all parties could decipher as of 1875140 and 
confirming that interpretation based on the historical background 
against which Congress and other individuals could judge the meaning 
of the rights-of-way as of 1875.141 
 Once the Brandt Court defined the interest as a simple easement, 
the majority easily resolved the case based on the common law which 
informs all grants of property interests. When drafting and articulat-
ing their intent, all parties can be expected to rely on the common law 
as applied to the terms of the statute in order to predict the expected 
interpretation of the scope of the easements. After quoting the Restate-
ment definition of an easement as a “nonpossessory right to enter and 
use land in the possession of another and obligat[ing] the possessor not 
to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement”142 and explain-
ing that easements may be abandoned (unlike most real property in-
terests which cannot be abandoned),143 the Court concluded that “[t]he 
essential features of easements—including, most important here, 
what happens when they cease to be used—are well settled as a matter 
of property law.”144 Easements are limited rights.145 
                                                                                                                  
 136. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265. 
 137. See id. at 1265-66. 
 138. Id. at 1264. 
 139. Great N., 315 U.S. at 271. 
 140. Id. at 271-72. 
 141. Id. at 273-77. 
 142. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  
SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)). 
 143. Id. (“Unlike most possessory estates, easements . . . may be unilaterally terminated 
by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate unencumbered by the 
servitude.” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. d, § 7.4 cmts. a, f 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000)) (alteration in original). 
 144. Id. 
 145. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.02(a), at 460 (David A. Thomas ed., Matthew 
Bender & Co., 2d Thomas ed. 2006) (1924) (“[A]n easement is ‘an interest in land in the 
possession of another’ that entitles the easement owner to ‘limited use or enjoyment’ of that 
land . . . .”(quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 450, at 2901 (AM. LAW INST. 1944))). 
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 The conclusion from this well-settled law—against which Congress 
was presumed to legislate and upon which both parties receiving 
rights-of-way and those encumbered by the rights-of-way identify a de-
terminate meaning, set their expectations, and establish their reli-
ance—is that “if the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the ease-
ment disappears, and the landowner resumes his full and unencum-
bered interest in the land.”146 
 The Brandt Court rejected multiple arguments where the govern-
ment attempted to inject post-1875 evidence to establish what Con-
gress meant when it set the terms for the 1875 Act right-of-way.147 
What rights were granted in 1875 (or what the railroads’ rights and 
expectations were in 1908 pursuant to the grant as-authorized in 
1875) cannot be determined based on events or conditions that oc-
curred or manifested at some later date after the grant without inject-
ing a high degree of indeterminacy into the grant. The Court explained 
that the government’s reliance on “later enacted statutes” was wrong, 
citing Leo Sheep and its contemporaneous-meaning discussion, be-
cause “[t]he case turn[ed] on what kind of interest Congress granted 
to railroads in their rights of way in 1875.”148 The Court further stated 
that these later statutes do not “shed light on what kind of property 
interest Congress intended to convey to railroads in 1875,”149 quoting 
the cautionary note regarding determinacy from United States v. Price, 
where the Court previously warned that “the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier   
                                                                                                                  
 146. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 499 (1893)); see 
also id. (“[W]hoever obtained title from the government to any . . . land through which ran 
this right of way would acquire a fee to the whole tract subject to the easement of the com-
pany, and if ever the use of that right of way was abandoned by the railroad company the 
easement would cease, and the full title to that right of way would vest in the patentee of 
the land.” (alterations in original) (quoting Smith, 148 U.S. at 499)); id. (“[T]he purchasers 
or grantees of the United States took the fee of the lands patented to them subject to the 
easement created by the act of 1824; but on a discontinuance or abandonment of that right 
of way the entire and exclusive property, and right of enjoyment thereto, vested in the pro-
prietors of the soil.”) (citation omitted). 
 147. See id. at 1266-68. 
 148. Id. at 1268 (emphasis added) (citing Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 
681 (1979)); see also id. (“The pertinent inquiry in this case is the intent of Congress when it 
granted land to the Union Pacific in 1862.” (quoting Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 681)).  
 149. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). 
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one.”150 Any attempts to change the scope of rights-of-way reservations 
were irrelevant after the interests in the land had already been  
allocated.151 
 The Brandt Court concluded that: 
[B]asic common law principles resolve this case. When the Wyoming 
and Colorado Railroad abandoned the right of way in 2004, the ease-
ment referred to in the Brandt patent terminated. Brandt’s land be-
came unburdened of the easement, conferring on him the same full 
rights over the right of way as he enjoyed over the rest of the Fox 
Park parcel.152  
This holding is certainly a correct interpretation of the law of ease-
ments and reflects the expectations of the burdened estate holder to 
be unburdened upon abandonment.153 
 Part of what was at stake in all of these cases, and particularly in 
Brandt, was a profound need for the protection of property rights as 
expressed in deeds and the sanctity of those rights measured by objec-
tive enforcement of determinate terms.154 As Justice Joseph Story ex-
plained in the case of Wilkinson v. Leland, once a legislature has made 
a grant of real property, that grant must be respected, and subsequent 
action cannot have retroactive effects to alter that initial conferral of 
property rights.155 The idea that property once transferred must be rec-
ognized as transferred, and that the act of the transfer itself should 
not be subject to retroactive change, is captured well in this passage: 
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that 
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held 
sacred. . . . In Terret vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, it was held by this 
Court, that a grant or title to lands once made by the legislature to 
any person or corporation is irrevocable, and cannot be re-assumed 
by any subsequent legislative act; and that a different doctrine is   
                                                                                                                  
 150. Id. (quoting Price, 361 U.S. at 313). For additional support for this proposition, see 
Hastings & D.R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889) (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 
U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839) for the proposition that once land is severed from the public lands 
and transferred to others, it is “one of the fundamental principles underlying the land system 
of this country” that “no subsequent law or proclamation” may alter that transfer). 
 151. See Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1268 (“[P]olicy shift[s] cannot operate to create an interest 
in land that the Government had already given away.”). 
 152. Id. at 1266. 
 153. See JAMES W. ELY, JR. & JON W. BRUCE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN 
LAND § 10.8, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (“[C]essation of purpose doctrine is 
designed to eliminate meaningless burdens on land and is based on the notion that parties 
that create an easement for a specific purpose intend the servitude to expire upon cessation 
of that purpose.”) (footnote omitted). 
 154. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 702 (“Brandt follows the Supreme Court’s longstanding 
policy of upholding certainty and predictability in land titles.”). 
 155. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657-58 (1829). 
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utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental principle of a 
republican government, and with the right of the citizens to the free 
enjoyment of their property lawfully acquired.156 
There are, of course, many other values at stake that require respect-
ing the determinacy of deeds, and the next Part analyzes a few addi-
tional benefits of adherence to the norm.  
V.   VALUES ADVANCED BY A DETERMINACY NORM  
OF DEED INTERPRETATION 
 The value and utility of a determinacy norm for deeds seems rela-
tively obvious, so this Part will be relatively short. It will just high-
light some of the benefits arising from, and values advanced by, ad-
hering to rules that inject determinacy into the meaning and inter-
pretation of deeds, some of which were also already noted in Part II. 
Determinate deeds are a fundamental element in any reliable prop-
erty system.157 The harder it becomes to confidently identify how a 
deed will be interpreted, the less stable the real property system be-
comes. Likewise, a higher confidence quotient for determinate mean-
ing in deeds breeds a healthy and prosperous property system. 
 The Latin maxim nemo dat qui non habet—one who does not have 
cannot give158—is a foundational guide in our society where ownership 
is the currency of property. In order to know what we can give, we need 
to understand what we have (or, own), and we primarily turn to our 
deeds to give us the answers. Knowing what one has to give and being 
able to predict the meaning of deed terms is a prerequisite to any le-
gitimate property transaction. Of course, the rights conveyed in deeds 
would be relatively worthless if they did not have a fixed and knowable 
meaning. Our ability to confidently assess the meaning of our deeds is 
vital to the necessary high level of certainty that contributes to any 
efficient economic transfers or investments in the property in ques-
tion.159 We need to know what all parties to a property transaction have 
                                                                                                                  
 156. Id.; see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 23 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property 
into public property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980))). 
 157. See LOCKE, supra note 36, at § 7, at 9-10; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE 
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 54 (1995) (“The right set of rules governing control over one’s 
person and the assignment of ownership of property play an indispensable part in any social 
system that seeks to maximize the welfare of its citizens.”). 
 158. Nemo dat qui non habet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 159. See Hernando de Soto, Opinion, What If You Can’t Prove You Had a House?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/opinion/20iht-edsoto.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0 (“We take the law for granted; but without legal documents, people do not 
exist in a market. If property, business organizations and transactions are not legally docu-
mented, they are fated to remain forever uninterpreted and society cannot work as a 
whole.”). 
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at the time of the transfer so that planning can occur, rights can for-
ever be identified, and interests in the property can be verifiably and 
effectively sold in the future.  
 Deeds provide information about the true allocation of ownership 
rights in any one piece of land valuable to a wide array of individu-
als.160 Deeds help identify rights for the grantor, grantee, and multiple 
interest holders in one piece of land. Deeds also work to facilitate mar-
ket transactions because those engaged in the transaction have a 
source from which to identify the rights one has, the authority to trans-
fer, and the rights the other can obtain through purchase. Deeds are 
the primary authority for judges interpreting disputes over competing 
claims to property ownership and in resolving conflicts between mul-
tiple interest holders.  
 Those who wish to buy from, invest in, contract with, lease from, or 
provide capital to real property owners, and many others will all want 
to know what is in a deed and how it will be interpreted. These stake-
holders need to have some confidence in finding a determinate mean-
ing for the deed terms before it is adjudicated. Individuals will want to 
know what they are getting when purchasing property, for example, 
and for that they will look at the deed. Prospective buyers of property 
require discernible deed rights with predictable interpretation to de-
termine the price they are willing to pay. Similarly, those who wish to 
provide loans based on a piece of property securing the loan or to make 
other capital investments in property will need assurances that they 
can identify what rights are included in the recipient’s ownership 
package as articulated in determinate deeds.161 Mortgages and deeds 
of trust, for example, will not issue without confidence in deed rights. 
Leaseholders need to inspect deeds to know what rights the lessor ac-
tually has to lease. Title insurance companies will base their premium 
on the level of security in a deed and the predicted meaning that will 
attach to its terms. Any interested members of the public that may 
need to interact with the property at some point in time will demand 
the ability to identify the rights in the relevant deeds with a high level 
of certainty about the determinate meaning of the deed’s terms. 
 Predictability of interpretation and reliability of enforcement of 
deed terms become the linchpins of land’s worth.162 To the extent there 
                                                                                                                  
 160. Gerald Korngold explains the broad public need for access to title information: “Cur-
rent and potential participants in land transfer and finance transactions need information 
so markets can operate efficiently and fairly, thus benefiting those particular players as well 
as society.” Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and 
Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 743 (2009). Although he was speaking of the 
need for records, deeds serve that function as well.  
 161. See de Soto, supra note 159 (“In the developing world, neither capital nor credit will 
venture where there are no clear property rights.”). 
 162. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 696 (discussing Brandt and contending that “[l]and-
owners rely on those definitions and terms [used by the common law of property] to establish 
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are any ambiguities, investors and others interested in a property will 
investigate the intent of the parties and the law existing at the time of 
the conveyance to predict how those terms will be interpreted. If the 
legal rules of deed interpretation give clear guidance as to what to look 
for and what the relevant time period is for the inquiry (time of con-
veyance), then a successful investigation is an achievable task, and one 
can estimate with some degree of certainty how the courts are likely 
to interpret the deed so long as the court also follows the same rules. 
But, if the methods and rules of interpretation are themselves indeter-
minate, then so too will be the meaning of the deed. Upon reading a 
deed and evaluating the terms in it, the potential investor will assess 
risk.163  
 Whenever one market participant wishes to exchange rights with 
another—such as in the acquisition of property—she demands some 
level of confidence in knowing what she is getting. The level of cer-
tainty the would-be acquirer or transferee has in the deed and its ex-
pected interpretation is directly proportional to the level of investment 
the acquirer will make in completing the deal. The higher the risk that 
a contrary interpretation will be adopted by the courts, the lesser the 
would-be acquirer’s confidence and willingness to invest in the prop-
erty. Transactions involving high-risk deeds due to uncertainty of in-
terpretation cannot occur on anything other than sub-optimal terms 
for parties on both sides of a negotiation. Deals to transfer the property 
may unnecessarily face a road block entirely, investment amounts will 
be lowered that may not need to be, or the price for the acquisition of 
the property in question will be inefficiently discounted to account for 
the high risk.  
 To avoid such inefficiencies, the law should strive to make the rules 
of deed interpretation and their application consistent, clear, and 
based in a determinate meaning identified from the intent of the par-
ties at the point of the deed creation or transfer.164 This injection of 
determinacy to deeds can only be achieved by giving deeds a fixed and 
unalterable meaning (or, at least only alterable through private, con-
sensual agreement to make a change). The more determinate the deed, 
                                                                                                                  
ownership of property”); Waldron, supra note 43, at 6 (“Citizens . . . need predictability in 
the conduct of their lives and businesses. . . . [F]reedom is . . . possible if people know in 
advance how the law will operate, and how they must act to avoid its having a detrimental 
impact on their affairs.”). 
 163. See Hernando de Soto, President, Inst. of Liberty & Democracy, Keynote Address 
at the Opening Ceremony of the IBA Annual Conference 2008: Law Connects, in INT’L B. 
NEWS, Dec. 2008, at 14, 14 (“[I]t’s the law that represents you in documents. It’s through law 
and legal documents that you’re able to identify facts, that you’re able to identify risks.”). 
 164. NORTH, supra note 3, at 137 (“Institutions determine the performance of  
economies[.]”). 
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where there is a higher level of confidence regarding the rights enforce-
able in it, the more likely that a deal—transfer, investment, mortgage 
or other loan associated with the rights, etc.—will be completed.  
 For similar reasons, individuals will not invest in their own prop-
erty in an efficient or optimal manner if they do not have confidence in 
what rights they already hold in the property pursuant to their deeds. 
This risk of owner under-investment is a real and unfortunate conse-
quence to indeterminate deeds. To incentivize more investment, we 
should do our very best to adhere to legal rules of deed interpretation 
that allow owners to make educated determinations of their deed 
rights with a low probability of error and a high probability that the 
courts will enforce those deeds according to the terms as understood 
by the parties to the deeds at the time of their conveyance.165 
 Deeds are only as good as their predictable interpretation. And pre-
dictions also cannot be made with any sense of accuracy unless there 
exists, and unless those interacting with the deeds have confidence in, 
a stable and objective court system that is accessible in the event of a 
dispute.  
 Moreover, beyond setting up the neutral court system, there must 
be some trust in the operational and interpretive rules of those insti-
tutions. There must be an ability to confidently and accurately predict 
how the neutral enforcement system will adjudicate disputes over the 
terms in deeds. Thus, we demand neutral institutions that follow those 
rules of interpretation that promote the determinacy norm.166 As North 
explains:  
[T]hird-party enforcement . . . has been the critical underpinning of 
successful modern economies involved in the complex contracting 
necessary for modern economic growth. . . . A coercive third party is 
essential. . . . Indeed, effective third-party enforcement is best real-
ized by creating a set of rules that then make a variety of informal 
constraints effective.167  
The existence of an authoritative source for interpretation is im-
portant, but it lacks much value if that source can upset determinacy 
in deeds. So we must ask that the institutions are independent, impar-
tial, neutral, and objective. But we must also ask that the rules they 
develop limit the pool of available outcomes in any deed dispute. The 
                                                                                                                  
 165. Waldron, supra note 43, at 6 (“Knowing in advance how the law will operate enables 
one to plan around its requirements. And knowing that one can count on the law to protect 
certain personal rights and property rights enables each citizen to deal effectively with other 
people and the state.”) (footnote omitted). 
 166. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25 (1962) (“In both games and 
society also, no set of rules can prevail unless most participants most of the time conform to 
them without external sanctions.”). 
 167. NORTH, supra note 3, at 35. 
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interpretive rules must solidify rights and act as a means for con-
straining the practical behavior of the judges regarding property 
deeds. Only then do individuals have the ability to predict what the 
judicial interpretation will be should any dispute arise, a necessary 
precondition to adjusting their own market behaviors. 
 The existence of a rule of law for the interpretation of deeds aids in 
advance of any court ruling the evaluation of whether one should in-
vest or acquire any particular piece of real property because the matter 
of court interpretation is not a speculative enterprise.168 When there is 
this neutrality and objectivity in the institutions and a commitment to 
finding determinate interpretations of deeds in adjudication, the judg-
ments of the adjudicating institutions are sufficiently predictable ex 
ante. Once parties engaging in a transaction can predict the resolution 
of possible disputes over deed terms, they can transact in a manner 
that avoids litigation. This can be accomplished by price adjustments 
to reflect risk or assignments of risk or liabilities. So, courts committed 
to the determinacy norm in deed interpretation are just as effective 
when they are not hearing cases, so long as they exist and so long  
as there is loyal and recognizable adherence to the determinacy norm  
in their deed-based jurisprudence. When those conditions obtain,  
parties order their affairs efficiently without the necessity of court  
intervention.169 
 So long as individuals know the means of interpretation of deeds 
that the courts will employ and that the courts will work to honor the 
deals made according to their original terms as understood and in-
tended by the parties, owners and potential owners or investors in the 
property will be able to predict how the neutral arbiters will resolve 
possible disputes or claimed ambiguities in the deeds.170 With determi-
nate deeds, confidence in what one owns, in what she has the authority 
to transfer, and in what other parties she will interact with own (and 
have the authority to transfer) breeds efficient incentives that help 
property flow smoothly in commerce. Once we accept that one can only 
own or transfer as much property as the deed allows, then it is easy to 
                                                                                                                  
 168. Cf. Hernando de Soto, The Destruction of Economic Facts, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
11_19/b4227060634112.htm (“The rule of law is much more than a dull body of norms: It is 
a huge, thriving information and management system that filters and processes local data 
until it is transformed into facts organized in a way that allows us to infer if they hang 
together and make sense.”). 
 169. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 166, at 25-27 (explaining that so long as the system is 
structured correctly, the markets benefit from, but need not use, the legal system as an en-
forcement mechanism). 
 170. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“The documented effect of increasing rule of law values on economic growth 
is robust. Individuals are more willing to invest in economic growth where property rights 
are stable, contracts are secure, and arbitrary governmental action is restrained.”). 
828  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:793 
 
also understand the importance of having the capability to discern 
what deed rights one has based on determinate interpretation rules 
that produce determinate deeds. It is in these determinate deeds  
and our trust that the courts will honor that determinacy in deed  
interpretation and enforcement that we achieve an authoritative and 
confident assessment of respective rights. 
 Finally, there is one other benefit worth mentioning briefly regard-
ing working toward determinate meaning in deeds—fairness and the 
avoidance of an unjust windfall for a party involved in the transfer of 
the property rights reflected in the deed. So long as the courts are 
working to find a meaning intended by the parties at the time of con-
veyance, then the prescribed meaning of the deed will be both deter-
minate and fairly allocate the rights as the parties would have ex-
pected. The court will interpret the deed’s terms in a manner that re-
flects the values that the parties set for the exchange at the time of 
conveyance. To upset that contemporaneous bargain would necessarily 
give one party an ex post advantage without requiring that he make a 
purchase to get it. The rules should never be set up in a way that would 
give someone more than they bargained for merely by interpreting a 
deed to mean something other than what the parties intended at the 
point of the deal.171 By following the determinacy norm, the courts 
avoid abetting such bonanzas. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This determinacy norm for the interpretation of deed terms is real. 
An examination of Brandt and the other cases described in this Article 
proves the determinacy norm’s presence and prevalence in the juris-
prudential standards for interpreting deeds, in spite of the fact that 
the courts have not given their bases and methods of decision making 
such a label. There is a purpose to the rules for deed interpretation 
that fails to get adequate recognition precisely because we have not 
created this organizing term and normative theme for these interpre-
tive rules. This Article has aimed to fill those thematic and termino-
logical gaps.  
 As part of the determinacy norm, there is a longstanding tenet of 
property that private conveyances and statutory land grants are to be 
interpreted at the time of the grant in accordance with the intent of 
                                                                                                                  
 171. Although it was in a different context, Justice Joseph Story made this point well 
when he explained that there is no case where “a legislative act to transfer the property of 
A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power 
in any state in the union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent 
with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.” 
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829).  
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the parties.172 The rule of law and the infrastructure for the protection 
of property rights that includes the determinate interpretation of 
deeds are vital components of the governmental structure that support 
the functioning of a private property system.173 Impartially securing to 
individuals what they own is a fundamental obligation of good govern-
ance.174 Doing so requires a neutral, transparent, consistent, and dis-
cernable set of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that effectu-
ates the intent of the parties executing the deeds. It requires judicial 
adherence to the determinacy norm for deeds, providing confident and 
authoritative measures of ownership so that parties can govern their 
own private relations and so that the courts can intervene when nec-
essary to resolve disputes in an objective manner and preserve the 
rights obtained in deeds.175 
 If we more forcefully support and openly acknowledge the quest to 
make deeds determinate that is furthered by the interpretive rules 
that we already recognize, the law and its deed-based jurisprudence 
can better monitor and check the actions of judges to be sure that they 
are living up to the purposes of the determinacy norm. Adding such 
safeguards to deed agreements will help us better identify and protect 
the rights in deeds that help organize our ownership society. 
  
                                                                                                                  
 172. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 191, supra note 4 (“Courts may determine the intent of the par-
ties in a disputed deed with reference to the position of the parties at the time of conveyance 
and in light of surrounding circumstances, and resort to rules of construction.”). 
 173. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 17 (1985) (“Within the original framework the rich array of procedural and jurisdic-
tional protections was expected to serve . . . the protection of private property, of ‘lives, lib-
erties, and estates’ that Locke considered the purpose of government.”). 
 174. James Madison firmly observed that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property 
of every sort . . . . This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which 
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.” James Madison, Property, NAT’L 
GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174. 
 175. See LOCKE, supra note 36, at 66 (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s unit-
ing into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of 
their property.”). 
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